The information ethics of Luciano Floridi's well-known Philosophy of Information (PI) project are explored as potential foundations for a deepening sense of stewardship in library and information studies (LIS) practice. The implications of PI's world view of "information objects" as having intrinsic value and resulting moral rights within the evolving "infosphere" are discussed in the context of current professional standards for collection management and preservation. Richard Fyffe's recent critical reconstruction of Floridi's concept of "ontic trust" as it might apply to librarianship as stewardship of the semantic environment is extended to better ground Floridi's conceptualization of the "infosphere" itself.
Introduction
The field of library and information studies (LIS) is rapidly expanding its sphere of interest and influence beyond the traditional functions of providing and protecting local print collections, into representing and retrieving digital documents of all descriptions, collecting and curating new types of data, and facilitating the evolution of information consumers into information creators and critics. The digital convergence of galleries, libraries, archives, and museums is already such that there is a Wikipedia entry under "GLAM" as an acronym for these cultural heritage institutions in the aggregate, and their digital boundaries appear increasingly contiguous to and perhaps even permeable with those of what philosopher Luciano Floridi terms "the infosphere," described as
The computerised description and control of the physical environment, together with the digital construction of a synthetic world. . . intertwined with a fourth area of application, represented by the transformation of the encyclopadeic macrocosm of data, information, ideas, knowledge, beliefs, codified experiences, memories, images, artistic interpretations, and other mental creations into a global infosphere. The infosphere is the whole system of services and documents, encoded in any semiotic and physical media, whose contents include any sort of data, information and knowledge. . . with no limitations either in size, typology, or logical structure [1, p. 8] .
defined as consisting of "semantic content consisting of one or more well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data" (SDI) [2, pp. 80-107] . To Floridi, then, information is both "a polymorphic phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, as an explicandum, it can be associated with several explanations, depending on the level of abstraction adopted and the cluster of requirements and desiderata orientating a theory" [1, p. 81] . The development of Floridi's definitions of information is integral to the success of PI as both a philosophical and a practical program [11] , and he has welcomed such discussions [12] .
Another key feature of PI is Floridi's continuing attentiveness to the ethical questions concerning information. Although the term "information ethics" has been used within both philosophical [13] and professional [14, 15] practice since Norbert Weiner's seminal work on "computer ethics" [16, 17] , Floridi's development of information ethics (IE) has broadened the scope of discourse to an almost universal macro-ethics centered on information [18] . Fundamental to Floridi's argument is the notion that all entities, even those that do not qualify as "information organisms" as such (that is, as agents, living or not, capable of processing information in some way), do possess a minimal informational value as "information objects" (that is, as entities, living or not, capable of being processed as information in some way) that qualify them as "moral patients" worthy of some measure of respect. IE therefore requires that ethical considerations extend far beyond the traditional ones that have been centered on human beings and certain entities (non-human primates being the leading examples of these) considered as close to human beings. He states, From an IE perspective, the ethical discourse now comes to concern information as such; that is, not only all persons, their cultivation, well-being and social interactions, and not just animals, plants and their proper natural life either. but also anything that exists, from paintings and books to stars and stones; anything that may or will exist, like future generations; and anything that was but is no more, like our ancestors. Unlike other nonstandard ethics, IE is more impartial and universal -or one may say less ethically biased -because it brings to ultimate completion the process of enlarging the concept of what may count as a centre of moral claims, which now includes every instance of information, no matter whether physically implemented or not. Such an all-embracing approach is made possible by the fact that IE adopts a LoA at which Being and the infosphere are co-referential [18, p. 65] .
However, a seeming difficulty in Floridi's IE for most is finding either metaphysical grounds [19] or epistemic support [20] for the belief that information is, quite literally, everything, though this view is common at certain LoAs, for instance, among theoretical physicists [21] . Paradoxically, as the Levels of Abstraction applied become lower, the ethical issues at stake appear to become higher, though Floridi observes that all of these concerns can and should enrich and complement our ethical thinking and decisions [18, p. 132] .
Also foundational to information ethics as envisioned by Floridi is his concept of the "ontic trust," which he promotes as an alternative perspective to the familiar modern "ontic divide" perspective that views all non-human entities primarily in terms of their potential utility for human purposes. This "ontic trust" draws upon the assets or "corpus" represented by the world, including all agents and patients (the infosphere), the donors being all past and current generations of agents, the trustees being all current individual agents, and the beneficiaries being all current and future individual agents and patients. He explains that this "trust" is similar to a social contract that encompasses the entire world and that all parties to it, simply by coming into being, are bound to all that already is, both unwillingly and inescapably. He notes that they should also do so caringly, because "participation in reality by any entity, including an agent -that is, the fact that any entity is an expression of what exists -provides a right of existence and an invitation to respect and take care of others" [18, p. 302] .
Elsewhere Floridi states, "The ontic trust is what is postulated by the approach supported by IE. According to IE, any form of reality (any instance of information/being), simply by the fact of of being what it is, enjoys a minimal, initial, overridable, equal right to exist (be left alone) and develop (not to be interfered) in a way that benefits its nature. Nothing is too humble to deserve no respect at all, i.e., to be rightly disrespectable in itself, not even a rock on the moon" [22, p. 11] .
IE claims that being, understood as information, is even more valuable than life and consciousness, and that meaninglessness is even more wrong than pain and suffering. Moreover, according to IE, one should evaluate the moral duty of any rational being in terms of his or her contribution to the growth of the infosphere, and any process, action, or event that negatively affects the whole infosphere -not just an information object -as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an instance of evil. Without information there is no moral action, but in IE, information moves from being a necessary prerequisite for any morally responsible action to being its primary object [18] .
Much of the metaphysical ground for Floridi's emphasis on the responsibilities of being has been previously covered by Jonas [23] , for instance, though without any reference to information as the foundation of being. It is perhaps worth noting that Jonas's work has attracted criticism for its inability to provide a convincingly universal basis for human ethical responsibility even towards other human beings on such a sweeping scale, as well as praise for its endeavors to do so [24] .
For IE, with its special focus on information and meaningfulness, critics such as Capurro [25] and Fuchs [26] have expressed deep reservations regarding its presumed promiscuous privileging of all informational content regardless of any contextual problems. Fallis and Whitcomb also make the pragmatically founded objection that "The philosophy of information deals not only with what information is, but also with how we should manage it. In order to effectively address this question, the philosophy of information needs to appeal to work in epistemology. In particular, in order to make better information management decisions, people need to be able to construct epistemic value hierarchies" [27, p. 185] . Elsewhere, Gnoli has proposed that "logical depth" may form the basis of such a value hierarchy, and that "Recorded knowledge, the system of all information produced by humans as consistently stored in documents, appears to be the logically deepest informational system" [28] . IE, however, given its foundational commitment to the intrinsic value of information objects, does not subscribe to a specific method for evaluating their relative worth and disregards these objections, though Floridi is certainly cognizant of what he terms these various "stages" towards a fully informational macro-ethics [18, pp. 21-26] . Other commentators argue that Floridi's ethical expansion of IE beyond the current boundaries of both bio-ethics [29] and eco-ethics [30] has failed so far to make an acceptable case for treating all entities as having any such intrinsic value, informational or otherwise.
Although there are many philosophical precedents specifically addressing ontological relations among living agents and non-living patients, ranging from classical philosophers such as Aristotle, through controversial Western thinkers such as Heidegger, to contemporary scholars in what Mitcham [31] has called the "first wave," exemplified by Winner's argument that artifacts can extend human political agency, through the "second wave," represented by Latour's demonstrations of networks in which humans and artifacts are treated as ontological equals, into the "third wave," shown by Borgmann's affirmation of the importance of human ethical agency in the design of agent-like artifacts, as well as by Skrbina's proposed revival of panpsychism as a modern world view [32] , or, more collectively and importantly, work within the critical indigenous philosophies of various First Nations [33, 34] , the ontocentric nature of IE remains the most provocative aspect of Floridi's PI project.
Floridi has also indicated interest in LIS as an applied field for PI [35, 36] . He has argued that by its very nature LIS does not and cannot take a normative epistemological perspective based on the strongly semantic definition of information, which is content consisting of well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data. He asserted that "the library [is] a place where educational and communication needs and values are implemented, defended, and fostered, where contents are assessed and selected for the public, and where practices like cataloging, for example, are far from being neutral, evaluation-free activities" [35, p. 39] , but that it cannot and should not be prescriptive in its perspective in the way that both what he called the "classic" (the socially distributed discovery and justification of knowledge as truth) and the "revolutionary" (the contention that knowledge, truth, and justification are all social constructions) versions of the epistemology of social knowledge are [35, p. 40] . His argument is lent substantive support in practice by the fact that working librarians almost never confine the contents of their collections to being "truthful" in the strongest sense, as that would exclude the vast majority of humanity's cultural heritage.
Floridi later elaborated on this argument, claiming, "LIS deals with contents understood as meaningful data. This has nothing to do with data handling in the sense of a mechanical and brainless crunching and management of bytes. It is, rather, connected with the activity of stewardship of a semantic environment" [36, p. 662] . In other words, Floridi has repeatedly invited LIS to occupy a key position within PI: the stewardship of all "content" pertaining to the generalized definition of information described above, which includes all semantic content consisting of one or more data that are well-formed and meaningful, such as the works of Confucius and Kant, for example. Nevertheless, few in LIS have expressed any interest in response to this invitation extended by Floridi, though the empirical [37] , ethical [38] , and ontological [39] issues relevant to PI are essential to LIS as well.
Fyffe and librarianship as stewardship of the semantic environment
Recently, however, Richard Fyffe [8] has taken up Floridi's open invitation for librarians to connect their traditional activities, which Fyffe notes, can indeed be considered as the "stewardship of a semantic environment," with IE. In his thoughtful piece on PI for portal: Libraries and the Academy, Fyffe attempts the difficult task of a critical reconstruction of Floridi's position. He writes that "Floridi's proposed reorientation of LIS's philosophical foundation from epistemology to value theory is especially timely as we shift our focus from local collections to shared responsibility for a network of collections held in distributed digital and print repositories. Detached from the immediacy of local needs and circumstances, our sense of responsibility for preserving the integrity of library collections can lose urgency, too easily becoming someone else's or no one's responsibility. Conceptually grounding our practice in epistemology increases that risk by distancing knowers from what they know and valuing information objects solely for their value to our epistemic projects and us. Floridi, by contrast, argues that the relationship between epistemic agents (knowers) and what they know is ecological and interdependent and that information objects have intrinsic value" [8, p. 268] .
Fyffe expresses some reservations about IE, going on to remark that "even if one accepts the basic form of Floridi's ethical argument -from humans as intrinsically valuable to all things as intrinsically valuable -it is still unclear. . . whether degrees of intrinsic worth can provide either sufficient guidance within the macro-ethical theory to which he aspires or even a sufficiently rich professional ethic" [8, p. 278] . He concludes that, "despite these problems, even if Floridi's arguments fall short of producing a universal macro-ethics, they help to illuminate the respect librarians and allied professionals (and many nonprofessionals as well) accord to the objects in their care, a respect that goes beyond those objects' purely instrumental value" [8, p. 279].
Fyffe then reframes IE's argument for ontic trust within the context of LIS by noting, "The claim is plausible (some version of it is accepted by many Buddhists, for instance), but it is not self-evident. Similarly, framed as an argument about the interdependence of knowledge, we should have to be able to show that any knowledge claim depends (in some meaning of depends that would need to be spelled out) on all previous knowledge. Even so, the argument has moral traction. We do not know to what causal chains, or to what chains of evidence and reasoning, we owe our existence or our current knowledge. A kind of moral prudence would urge at least minimal respect for any object or knowledge-claim, lest we disrespect that which made us (or our current knowledge) possible in the first place. Floridi's argument may serve as a version of John Rawls's 'veil of ignorance" [8, p. 279 ].
Fyffe's use of Floridi's concept of "ontic trust" in discussing the importance of ignorance is particularly apposite in that, as discussed above, Floridi has commented on the special nature of normativity in LIS practices. Elsewhere, Floridi also explicitly refers to Rawls's "veil of ignorance" in the context of information and moral decisions [8, p. 22] though, interestingly, he does not connect these larger implications of humanity's ignorance with intellectual humility in the way that Fyffe has done. Fyffe, therefore, can be considered as adding this as a potential "open problem" for PI to Floridi's existing list of these [1, pp. 26-45] .
Fyffe asserts that, "LIS. . . while normative in some domains, is not epistemologically normative. Librarianship is not responsible for justifying the knowledge claims of physicists (for example) or assessing the methodology used by epidemiologists. Librarianship does, however, document the status of evidence and assist users in interpreting and evaluating the sources and provenance of their evidence" [8, p. 271] . Patrick Wilson's well-known phrase "second-hand knowledge" as applied to LIS is apt here, as well as his comparison of the communicative competencies of a skilled reference librarian with those of a Pyrrhonian skeptic in the careful presentation of potentially informative resources [40, pp. 194-196] .
As a librarian, Fyffe is also particularly concerned with preservation. He states that "Long-term preservation has always been a core function of librarianship, and as we wrestle with the challenges of building a sustainable digital information infrastructure it is an increasingly prominent concern. Yet the obligation to undertake preservation efforts that span human generations is difficult to justify on purely instrumental grounds. Justifying such an obligation requires that we assign value to the epistemic needs of persons who do not yet exist. The difficulty is not simply the practical one of predicting future information needs. It is the conceptual challenge that the choices we make now may fundamentally change those future needs. This is a notoriously tricky philosophical challenge. A professional ethic constructed along Floridi's 'stewardship' lines more clearly justifies the commitment to long-term preservation and sustainability" [8, p. 279 ].
Koehler's overview of the history of library ethics confirms the existence of an essential tension between the library's mandate to protect as well as to provide access to a collection [41] , reflected in many of the profession's dictates, ranging from the nineteenth century's Quincy Plan [42] , to the twentieth century's Five Laws of Library Science [43] , to today's international initiatives for involving a wider variety of stakeholders in investing in digital preservation initiatives [44] .
Since it has been long established within LIS that not everything can or should be kept, the question of "what can we afford to lose?" tends to be a pragmatic one, usually based on economic considerations [45] in the absence of more evaluative ones [46] , and often disregarded until it is too late to reconsider or to recover [47] . For instance, the UNESCO's exemplary "Memory of the World" program has only 301 entries on its registry of those documentary resources considered essential to global cultural heritage [48] and, even for these, there are no known sanctions against damaging or even destroying the Hittite cuneiform tablets from Bogazköy, for example.
A representative sampling of the current normative dimensions of GLAM practices can be seen through the lens of three major cultural heritage professional associations in the United States: the American Library Association, the Society of American Archivists, and the American Alliance of Museums. For instance, the American Library Association's "Core Values" statement articulates professional beliefs in access, confidentiality/privacy, democracy, diversity, education and lifelong learning, intellectual freedom, preservation, the public good, professionalism, service, and social responsibility [49] . Similarly, the stated professional objectives of the Society of American Archivists are to "select, preserve, and make available historical and documentary records of enduring value" [50] . Further statements specific to collections indicate that archivists are to preserve and protect the authenticity of records in their holdings by documenting their creation and use in hard copy and electronic formats, to preserve the intellectual and physical integrity of those records, to promote open and equitable access in accordance with legal requirements, cultural sensitivities, and institutional policies, and to protect the privacy rights of records donors, subjects, and users as necessary.
Finally, the Code of Ethics of the American Alliance of Museums asserts that the distinctive character of museum ethics derives from the ownership, care, and use of objects, specimens, and living collections representing the world's natural and cultural common wealth for the public trust. This value system for collections carries with it particular presumptions of ethical and lawful ownership, priorities in protection and permanence, proper care and custody, appropriate documentation and accountability, adequacy of accessibility, and responsibility in acquisition, loan, and disposal [51] .
While these three axiologies may emphasize particular values to varying extents, taken together, they represent the various facets of what Osburn calls the "stewardship of the social transcript" [52, pp. 228-229] as generally understood in professional practice. What is left unstated, as Fyffe asserts, is any explicit consideration of time, beyond the general mention of "preservation" in certain contexts, and any explicit consideration of value beyond mentions of "enduring" and "common wealth."
The Association of College & Research Libraries (ACRL)'s new Framework for Information Literacy for Higher Education does provide a more explicit statement that "information possesses several dimensions of value, including as a commodity, as a means of education, as a means to influence, and as a means of negotiating and understanding the world" [53] , but it does not view information or information objects as having any intrinsic or inherent value beyond those instrumental purposes for scholars or students.
Relatedly, Koehler [41, p. 242] sees a particular danger in the current rush to digitization in that, "as information ceases to be perceived or defined as 'real objects' -books and other solids -it loses a consequentialist quality. Information becomes no longer real. And as it is no longer real, its manipulation or application is therefore inconsequential." The information objects, accordingly, may also be perceived as inconsequential, regardless of whether these are literary bitstreams [54] , interactive emulations [55] , or digital representations of physical ephemera [56] .
Thus, Floridi's concept of stewardship is more embracing and encompassing, since the basis of his information ethics as noted above is that information at whatever level, analog or digital, deserves some level of respect if not protection, and that the world itself is now the infosphere. Our own duty as moral agents in the infosphere (or, in Floridi's terms, as information organisms or "inforgs" that possess a special nature as "structuring structures" that are self-conscious and self-determining [57, pp. 279-280]), is to contribute to the growth of the infosphere, to prevent the destruction of information objects, and any process, action, or event that negatively affects the whole infosphere. The overarching ethical question asked by IE is "What is good for an informational entity and the infosphere in general"? rather than the traditional ethical question regarding what is good for an individual human being and humanity in general?
Floridi's PI project includes both an "architectural" LoA approach to all semantic content [2, pp. 182-208] and "an 'architectural' ethics specifically intended for the creators, designers, and users of the infosphere [8, p. 302] . This is, of course, very similar to librarians' ontological practices of classification and indexing for communities of users: practices which, as Fyffe observes, are semantically rather than epistemically normative, "Librarianship is fundamentally concerned with maintaining and enhancing information environments over time. These environments include enduring information objects, the metadata that describe these objects and their provenance, and the behavior of library users. The integrity of these environments makes possible the epistemic projects of those users, but librarianship is not, itself, epistemological" [8, p. 283] .
He suggests that Floridi's PI, especially his concept of a stewardship of semantic environments, offers a promising framework for understanding this type of normativity. He concludes, "In fact, [Floridi's] arguments point toward a continuity of semantic construction that begins with the emergence of language, writing, and other cognitive artifacts and encompasses modern communication and computational technologies" [8, p. 282] .
Such continuity is also demonstrated by the emerging importance of the GLAM framework discussed earlier, which is inclusive of much wider cultural communities. Fyffe writes "To understand librarianship as stewardship, therefore, is not to privilege information over users but rather to take a holistic, ecological view of the 46 
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interactions of knowers (including library users or patrons) and their semantic environment" [8, p. 281] . He shows that PI connects with the move beyond traditional library "bibliographic instruction" into contemporary initiatives focused on "information literacy" by knowers, efforts that are becoming increasingly contextual, and involve a widening variety of information objects inside and outside individual collections. As the professional emphasis of LIS shifts from local collection concerns and local users to shared responsibility for more expansive collections such as the Digital Public Library of America, Europeana, the Internet Archive, Portico, or the HathiTrust, to name a few initiatives, the acknowledgment of a more global, more enduring stewardship of the infosphere itself seems increasingly inviting, though certainly not inevitable. Fyffe's work here has eloquently and elegantly extended Floridi's earlier invitation to his colleagues in LIS to participate in this effort.
Grounding the argument for information objects
Although Fyffe did not go on to make this particular point, such a widening perspective on "information objects" might well be compared to Suzanne Briet's famous view of "documents" [58] , which also served a similar purpose in broadening the scope of information work well beyond the library. Briet asserted, according to Buckland [59] that "the document," rather than being viewed solely as texts or as variations in textual format, should be more accurately viewed as any "thing" that can be interpreted as some kind of evidence, whether textual or otherwise. Buckland [60] also observes that Briet's criteria for viewing something as a "document" were quite specific: that the entity be a material one, that the intent be that the entity should be treated as evidence, that the entity be processed in some way, and that the perception is that the entity is a document. All of these criteria are, naturally enough, instrumental to the purposes of the user of the document, but there is no intrinsic value accorded to the document itself. Although there have been a number of emendations to Briet's original conceptualization, the instrumental nature of the "document" perspective itself has only recently come into question [61] . Other commentators, such as Frohmann [62] , Lund [63] , and Robinson [64] have suggested a much broader approach to information-bearing entities as documents, as documents can take physical or virtual form, or both, at different times.
Briet's most celebrated example of a document involves the study of an antelope in a zoo, but, among her other examples, she mentions that even stones in a museum of mineralogy might serve as documents [58, p. 10] . Clearly, the lunar rocks brought back from NASA missions could be documents, but other rocks left on the moon would not be documents, according to Briet's definition, since they are not available to be instrumental (or, to use another familiar term from LIS, relevant) to a human user's purpose. However, as noted above, Floridi's PI would accord even inaccessible rocks on the moon at least some status as "information objects" within the infosphere.
Beyond the rich history of rocks within the geological sciences [65] [66] [67] , there are many other ways in which rocks are information objects. For instance, new analyses of the lunar rocks brought back from the Apollo 14 mission in 1971 has resulted in an estimated age for the Moon's separation from the Earth at roughly 4.51 billion years, which adds 140 million years to earlier estimates and thus provides new information regarding the evolution of the solar system [68] . Similarly, 3.2 billion year old rocks on the ocean floor are providing information as to when photosynthesis began there [69] . Geophysical surveys, including remote sensing and ground-penetrating radar, of the area around Stonehenge are producing new evidence of the "hidden" archaeological features surrounding this site [70] . Rock art from across the African continent is now more accessible to appreciation and analysis by a wider audience through the British Museum's digitized African Rock Art Image Project than in its physical locations, frequently inhospitable to visitors [71] .
Fyffe has argued that, in order to make Floridi's IE both viable and valuable as a guide for LIS practice, it should be able to demonstrate why very long term preservation of information and increasing access should be preferred over loss or restriction. In advancing his notion of information objects as having intrinsic rather than purely instrumental value, Floridi does expand our ethical viewpoint far beyond the local collection and its user community, both of which serve as normative reference points for current LIS practices. He draws from Aldo Leopold's concept of land ethic, "which enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land," quotes Mark Rowlands's suggestion that rocks have semantic value as potential indices to the environment, and echoes Lynn White's query, "Do people have ethical obligations towards rocks?" [18, pp. 102-133]. Floridi proposes, "The time has come to translate environmental ethics into terms of infosphere and informational entities" [18, p. 133] .
As Google Earth, EarthCube, and similar digital initiatives have made it easier to understand our physical environment informationally, and as LIS expands its purview beyond its own walls, the example of rocks might help to further this discussion of how and why Floridi's "information objects" could ground an ethical theory for LIS, and how LIS could help to ground IE. Although Floridi tends to illustrate his ideas with topics taken from ICT, there is some truth to Hacking's remark that "When thinkers. . . want to say something is real, they resort to rocks" [72, p. 204] .
While the lithosphere (the geological term for the earth's crust and mantle) itself could arguably be considered as an "information object" under a suitably macro-level of analysis using Floridi's definition above, the scope of such a discussion would be far beyond the present purpose. Or, if the intention were to explore the concept of certain rocks being perceived as more valuable than others, such a discussion might center on the economics of black diamonds or black shale. Or, if the intention were to focus on rocks only as the "symbolic" patients of human beings as "structuring" agents, attention might turn to Uluru in Australia, the Hajar al-Aswad in Saudi Arabia, Bukit Kelamn in Indonesia, Plymouth Rock in North America, Zuma Rock in Nigeria, or to dozens of lesser-known examples.
But rocks either as documents or as information objects can be viewed as much more than simply being the surface on which we stand or as the source of certain scientific or societal ideas. By definition, rocks are "distinguished by their composition and their physical properties, and consist of aggregates of minerals (very commonly silicates or calcium carbonate) and occasionally also organic matter (as in, for example, lignite and oil shale). They vary in hardness, and include soft materials such as clays. Rocks form the substance of the earth's crust and mantle, down to the upper surface of the metallic core. Those occurring at the earth's surface are broadly divided into three classes according to their process of formation: igneous, metamorphic, and sedimentary" [73] . Rocks also have a life cycle involving creation, change, and destruction, though the cycle is much longer than that of any biological lifespan.
Collections of rocks have a long history as well, ranging from the scattered stones sometimes found in Neanderthal gravesites [74] , to Australia's recently-developed National Rock Garden [75] , to the Nuveen Jain collection of "witnessed" meteorites, conservatively valued at $8.5 million [76] . Most geological collections in museums and universities, however, have purely scientific and teaching purposes. Chalk [77] provides an illuminating discussion of the diverse ways in which collections of rocks are mobilized as natural specimens and as intellectual arguments in the earth sciences.
Among these collections are those of the Smithsonian Institution in the United States and the British Museum in the United Kingdom. The Smithsonian's Department of Mineral Sciences includes over 600,000 specimens of rocks and minerals, while the British Museum of Natural History has approximately 500,000. However, some of the most interesting rock specimens are housed elsewhere, usually in the ethnological collections of these museums. So-called "thunderstones" were actually foundational to the ethnological discipline, as it was the discovery that a variety of stone artifacts in Asia, Europe and the Americas, often thought to be the remnants of legendary or biblical beings, were actually the products of prehistoric activity that could be identified as similar to those of less technologically-advanced contemporary cultures that made them scientifically interesting [78, 79] . Once "thunderstones" were identified as very early hand axes and "elf arrows" as primitive stone projectile points, ethnologists as well as paleontologists became assiduous collectors and analysts of these rocks.
In fact, the oldest "information object" in the Smithsonian's Human Origins section is a fist-sized pebble with a single jagged edge, which has been identified as a prehistoric tool known as an Oldowan "chopper." The term "chopper" is used to refer to a pebble artifact in which several flakes have been struck from one side to form a sharp edge for cutting. This particular object is called "Oldowan" because it is from the Olduvai Gorge in Africa, and is presumed to have been made by a hominid that preceded Homo sapiens approximately 1.8 million years ago. The fossilized bones discovered with the Oldowan rocks (the so-called Oldowan toolkit) were named Homo habilis ("Handy Man") in the 1960s in recognition of the connection between the bones and the rocks [80] .
The British Museum's "Museum of the World" also holds a similar object which is identified as "one of the oldest objects" in its collection. And, yet, clearly these "choppers" are rocks as well: it is presumably the hominid "design" element that makes these particular rocks of special importance. Other, even older "choppers" have now been identified at Gona in Ethiopia, dating from between 2.5 and 2.6 million years ago, and at the Lomekwi 3 site in West Turkana in Kenya from approximately 3.3 million years ago [81] . These proto-tools were the primary means of augmenting primate technological capabilities and presumably advancing primate cognitive abilities for millions of years; no other known tool has been so dominant for nearly so long. Our own taken-for-granted "instrumental" approach to being in the world is surely grounded in this history.
As the hominin horizon and rudimentary techniques for creating these early prototools are pushed back even further with new discoveries and the expectation that new discoveries are yet to be made, these become closer to known behavior by modern chimpanzees in collecting, throwing, and utilizing rocks for various purposes. Although toolmaking was once thought to be a purely human capability, now that many other species have been found to be capable of tool use and tool creation, it is no longer felt to be a defining characteristic of the hominid genealogy [82] though it remains a vital one, and is obviously essential to the infosphere itself.
While some of the later hand-axes (notably the more aesthetically pleasing Acheulean type, which also represents a technological advance on the Oldowan toolkit as it has two edges rather than a single edge, is largely symmetrical, and displays highly sophisticated "knapping" techniques) have been proposed as the true point of origin for human art, being far older than rock art [83] , the utilitarian rather than symbolic nature of these rocks have precluded general agreement on their possessing artistic value as well, though this argument too remains unresolved [84] .
Nevertheless, when a particular pebble from the Olduvai Gorge region is examined in a museum, it can presumably provide evidence in terms of its origin, its geology, its provenance, its history as shown by the natural or non-natural impacts its surface or interior displays, or the accompanying objects with which it was found. However, there are no necessary accompanying ethical considerations surrounding its presentation or preservation. Even if a discovery were to be made of a presumptive rock toolkit of the so-called "last common ancestor" between the chimpanzee and hominid lines approximately 6 to 7 million years ago, there is no such imperative beyond what a particular scientist in the field or curator in the recipient collection might deem appropriate. This is especially troubling, as there are many instances in which an original evidentiary interpretation is shown to be incorrect, is superseded, or remains ambiguous. Documentary evidence, by definition, is evidence of something: a document that is no longer evidentiary is no longer a document, and can be disregarded or even discarded during the so-called "information life cycle" as part of routine professional practice. Day notes that this predominantly present-oriented view of information, while obviously utilitarian, "closes off the past, present, and future to other forms of becoming informed that may not be seen as information" [85, p. 44 ] -at least from our present perspective.
Contrarily, Floridi's PI perspective offers some minimal level of respect even for a rock that, for instance, bears evidence of hominin rather than human contact, as shown by the different angle and pressure exerted by the non-human primate shoulder bones, which are dissimilar from those of even early hominids [86] . The information object also merits consideration for its other informational attributes, which may co-exist at different Levels of Abstraction, according to PI. This also allows for acknowledgment that future investigations, different interpretations, or new agents may emerge as important at any time. For example, fractures in the bones of the famed Australopithecus afarensis ("Lucy") fossilized remains from Ethiopia have only recently been examined through 3D printing and seem to indicate her cause of death as a fall from a significant height such as a tree [87] , a somewhat astonishing discovery about a death that occurred approximately 3.2 million years ago, and one that is being hotly contested due to the obvious fragility of the fossil itself [88] . Importantly, IE provides a rationale of respect beyond current instrumental utility for such information objects at risk.
The efforts made by First Nations peoples to repatriate or at least to assign responsible guardianship to their sacred objects provide an instructive example of this, as those attributes exist, just as any other historic or scientific attributes would, and should also exert appropriate influence in the "infosphere." Although we do not know all the qualities attributed to the Oldowan "choppers" and similar objects such as "thunderstones" over the millennia, let alone to "Lucy" and other once living beings now existing only as stone, we may well accord these too a "Rawlsian respect" as suggested by Fyffe, both for their past and future informativeness, and for our own ignorance.
Concluding the argument for ontic trust
Floridi has quoted an estimate of a billion years for the continued existence of life on earth before an inevitable increase in solar temperature will make it uninhabitable [18, p. 3] . Although it is not unlikely that such current hypotheses as that zircon samples from Western Australia contain biogenic material from the Hadean era of over 4 billion years ago [89] or that minerals and microbes may have co-evolved to provide life [90] will prove to be as unsubstantiated as other previous theories of abiogenesis, we may still wish to extend some courtesy to these and all our other "ancestral" rocks in Floridi's "ontic trust" that will hopefully last far beyond any individual lifespan, human or other. Even if we cannot reasonably extend respect to all information objects, remembering and respecting our own abiding ignorance may also help to ground our practices for the next billion years.
Koehler [41, p. 242] quotes from science fiction writer Isaac Asimov in observing, "that everything erodes over time and is eventually dissolved into the background noise," and adds, "The librarian has a cultural mandate to seek to conserve memories, information from that erosion." If any information objects can be said to "prove" the importance of an "ontic trust" that merits our care, as well as an encompassing "veil of ignorance" for both information organisms and information objects that merit our attentiveness, it might well be the rocks on which we ground our arguments.
[AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper was directly inspired by the 2015 publication by the late Richard Fyffe, the Samuel R. and Marie-Louise Rosenthal Librarian of Grinnell College in Iowa, and is dedicated to his memory as a scholar-librarian.]
